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MILITARY

Negative.

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CAA

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EXTERNAL-POLITICAL

1. US-Soviet Relations

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During the week Khrushchev took the opportunity of public receptions -- one at the Kremlin at New Year's, the other at the Cuban Embassy -- to set his own tone for US-Soviet relations on the eve of the Kennedy administration. As is often the case, he seemed to be talking out of both sides of his mouth. On the one hand, he went out of his way at the Kremlin reception to strike conciliatory, optimistic notes, and took a line intended to give the impression of magnanimity in his let-bygones-be-bygones reference to the U-2 incident. However, his speech at the Cuban reception was marked by familiar charges against US "imperialism" which suggested no readiness to alter the conventional Soviet picture of the US as the main threat to world peace. Khrushchev's appeal for good relations with the new administration was thus clouded over by his insistence in repudiating the present one. This approach has the obvious advantage for the Soviets of permitting unmitigated attacks on US policy while giving the impression of willingness to seek improvement of relations with the Kennedy administration. Should such improvement take place, Moscow could then portray this turn of events as a victory of consistently sound Soviet policy. If there is no such improvement, the Soviets would then apply their present criticism of US policy to the new administration. Either way, the calculation would be to gain at the expense of US prestige and further the objective of isolating the US. Khrushchev's expressed willingness to drop the UN item on the U-2 may be based on the desire to avoid an embarrassing debate on the RB-47 and perhaps also set the stage for a gesture in the form of releasing the surviving RB-47 crew-members. His attacks on US "imperialism" in regard to Cuba serve as a convenient screen for Soviet intervention in Laos.

2. Laos

The Soviet press this week for the first time indicated in a backhanded manner Soviet involvement in Laos by reporting that Pote Sarasin's communique on the Jan. 4 meeting of the SEATO Council included the "hackneyed assertion about the delivery of military material by Soviet airplanes from North Vietnam" and also by alleging that the US so far has not succeeded in persuadin g its SEATO allies that "Soviet Union is delivering communist soldiers to Laos in airplanes."

Other evidences of the gravity of the situation which bit by bit is being disclosed to the Soviet public is treatment of Laos as a military situation with a map showing where fighting is in progress, discussion of Pathet Lao capability for protracted guerrilla war and forces that the US is planning to throw into the struggle.

Counter-posed to the above picture of the Laotian situation are emphasis on the fact the Eisenhower Administration will soon leave office, that Kennedy has declined to comment on Laos, that US allies are divided over Laos, and that possibilities for a peaceful solution exist if seized in time.

Until January 6 suggestions in the Soviet press for a peaceful solution in Laos concentrated on the convening of an international conference of the 19[illegible] Geneva type. On January 6, however, the press switched to the contention that the way to restore peace in Laos would be to reestablish the ICC there.

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3. Cuba

Although in terms of actual significance the "crisis" of an allegedly impending US invasion of Cuba and Soviet involvement therein is dwarfed by developments in Laos, the Soviet press has attempted to give its readers the opposite impression. While reports from Hanoi, Phnom Penh, etc., have been largely restricted to relatively terse TASS reports, Cuban charges have received blanket coverage in all Soviet papers. The US action in breaking off diplomatic relations was stigmatized as a provocation and "the last step before embarking on outright aggression." A determined effort was maintained to place the "blame" on President Eisenhower for attempting to overthrow Castro before leaving office, and it was pointed out in the Soviet papers that President-elect Kennedy has declined to associate himself with the severence of diplomatic relations.

4. Congo

After a rare note of approval for Hammarskjold's protest on the use of Ruanda-Urundi by Mobutu forces as a base of operations against Lumumba elements, the Soviet press resumed its attacks on the Secretary General as before. Pravda (Jan. 6) charged that there was no coincidence between the resumption of Mobutu operations against Kivu and Hammarskjold's arrival in Congo, that Hammarskjold had lost the last remnants of responsibility, and that his only concern was the fate of the colonialists. Soviet press reports continued to depict Stanleyville as the center of national resistance. The events in Kivu province were said to show growing pro-Lumumba support in the country. The press also reported the arrival of the UN Conciliation Commission in Leopoldville, stressing the refusal of some states to participate in its work. The Casablance conference of heads of African governments was represented as an expression of African determination to bring colonialist oppression to an end.

5. Iran

An Izvestiya (Jan. 5) summary of an article in the Soviet journal Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn taking sharp issue with the Shah's account in his memoirs of the 1958-59 Soviet-Iranian negotiations seemed to connote a fall in the temperature of relations between the two countries. The article pictured the Shah as insincere in initiating the negotiations which were, it says, intended by the Iranians essentially as blackmail with a view to obtaining increased US aid. The article concludes with the remark that the negotiations unmasked the insincerity and two-facedness of the Shah's policy.

6. Governmental Visits

Indonesian delegation led by General NASUTION has received full honors including publicized meetings with Khrushchev, attendance at ballet, visits to military airfield and Moscow University, etc. Attention has been given in Soviet press to military side of visit with emphasis on Nasution's role as head of the delegation and predominance of uniforms of both sides in press photos.

The arrival of Pakistani Minister of Fuels BHUTTO on December 23 was announced by all papers as was his subsequent reception by Khrushchev. The papers also reported a lunch for Bhutto on January 5 given by SKACHKOV, Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, and attended by Deputy Chairman MIKOYAN, Minister of Geology and Oil Conservation ANTROPOV, and others.

TASS on January 5 reported that as a result of the current trip by a Supreme Soviet delegation to Bolivia and Chile, an official Bolivian delegation will visit Moscow in "the second half of January".

INTERNAL

7. Leadership

All Moscow-resident Presidium figures gathered in the Kremlin for the traditional December 31 party to hear N.S. KHRUSHCHEV confidently toast in the New Year. Khrushchev also displayed great self-confidence two nights later at the Cuban Embassy National Day celebration. Casting himself the next day (January 3) in the role of a modest self-made man, in the company of his family and his first village teacher, he let himself be photographed by Soviet youth attending a Kremlin New Year Tree Party. Aside from participating in a few protocol matters such as the January 5 Indonesian Embassy reception, Khrushchev has left negotiations with the Indonesian Government delegation to the "chief of the Soviet delegation", First Deputy Premier A.I. MIKOYAN.

Presidium candidate-members Ya. E. KALNBERZIN and A.P. KIRILENKO have not received publicity during the week. Presidium Member N.V. PODGORNYY and candidate members D.S. KOROTCHENKO, K.T. MAZUROV and V.P. MZHVANADZE all attended sessions of the Supreme Soviets of their republics (reported in Republic press, see below).

Publicity given to Presidium attendance at large activist meetings in the provinces called to "discuss" the results of the 1960 Moscow Conference of Communist Parties understandably diminished somewhat at first this week but picked up again after the holidays with the speeches of P.N. POSPELOV in Perm on January 4 and N.A. MUKHITDINOV at Ashkhabad on January 5. Publicizing of over 50 such meetings to date of which 35 have been attended by members of the top leadership suggests a "grass-roots" drive that will continue to the eve of the January 10 plenum of the Central Committee -- announced as a plenum on "agriculture".

8. Six Republic Supreme Soviets Convene

The Supreme Soviets of six Republics (Armenian, Belorussian, Georgian, Kirgizian, Moldavian, and Ukrainian) convened during the last week of 1960. All served the functions of approving budgets, government economic plans interium actions effected by their presidiums and the "results" of the November Communist and Workers Parties Conference. No significant personnel shifts were brought to light by the sessions. It is perhaps noteworthy that former Armenian first secretary S.A. TOVMASYAN (ousted Dec. 29), who supposedly has been transferred to other work, was not mentioned in press accounts of attendance at the Armenian Supreme Soviet.

9. Tselinnyy Kray Organization Complete

All major party and government posts in the newly-created Tselinnyy Kray (Kazakhstan) have now been filled. (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, Dec. 30). Only five of the members of the party kraykom are members of the Kazakh CC elected March 13, 1960 and only three out of the 11 on the Ispolkom are Kazakh CC members, suggesting that a high proportion of the new leadership, like former USSR Agriculture Minister V.V. MATSKEVICH, has been imported to Tselinnyy Kray from other areas. A.I. KOSLOV, Kazakstan Minister of State Farms and former (Jan. 1960) USSR Minister of State Farms, will be a member of the Ispolkom under Matskevich. It is well to remember that the Kray Ispolkom officials are technically only temporarily appointed by the Presidium of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet pending election and convocation of a Kray Soviet of Workers Deputies which will legally choose this body. Therefore, there could be further change.

10. Government Changes

a. New Minister of Health in Kirgizia. On December 21 A.A. AYDARALIEV was named Kirgiz Minister of Health replacing Yu. Ye. DANILOV who had been released some months earlier on August 9 (Sovetskaya Kirgizia, Jan. 3). The Embassy has no previous record of Aydaraliev.

b. RSFSR River Fleet Deputy Minister Dies. On December 29, V.M. PTASHNIKOV, Deputy Minister of the RSFSR River Fleet since 1947 died. In addition to appropriate ministerial members, mourners included A. ARISTOV and D. POLYANSKIY. (Pravda, Jan. 3).

MILITARY

(Negative)

For the Ambassador:

Boris H. Klosson

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Counselor for Political Affairs

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